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Abstract— Opinion diffusion is often simulated in agent-
based models to reveal the perpetuation of norms and beliefs. 
This paper presents a dual attitude model where agents’ 
interaction, information search, and opinion formation are 
influenced by the need for cognitive closure (NFCC). Two 
experiments simulated topic advocacy with either high- or low- 
NFCC agents. Experiment one initiated societies with unbiased 
distribution of NFCC levels between advocates of two competing 
topics, while experiment two initiated biased distributions of 
NFCC levels between the topics. Results in the unbiased 
condition showed that the popularity of the majority topic 
increases over time in high NFCC societies while it decreases 
over time in low NFCC societies. These results are magnified in 
the biased context where high NFCC agents provided an NFCC-
advantage for their advocaed topic. When high NFCC agents’ 
advocated topic is the majority or equal at initiation, the topic’s 
popularity will increase significantly over time. When high 
NFCC agents’ advocated topic is minority at initiation, these 
agents resist the assimilative pressures of the majority topic to 
protect their own topic from popularity losses. Tracking 
simulations over time revealed different dynamics generated 
between the two experimental conditions, and showed the roles 
low NFCC agents and edge-of-cluster agents play in enabling the 
emergence of such patterns. These results may shed light on the 
impact NFCC individuals have in within-society and between-
societies cultural shifts. 
Keywords— Need for Cognitive Closure, Opinion Diffusion, 
Social Psychology, Political Psychology. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several classes of social influence agent-based models 
(ABM) have shaped our knowledge about opinion diffusion. 
Ising, voter, and Sznajd models [1, 2, 3], evolutionary game 
theoretic models [4], culture dissemination model [5], and 
bounded confidence models [6] are classes with varied levels 
of complexity and realism. Most of these models tended to 
take a binary or bipolar approach to the formalization of 
opinions and had assumptions that were weakly supported by 
experimental studies [7, 8]. Given Mastroeni’s [7] recent 
search drawing no ABM models from the social psychology 
domain, there might, thus, be cross-disciplinary benefits for 
social psychologists to make their ABM work more 
prominent, and develop models with higher fidelity to 
established social psychological theories [9]. 
Jager [10] noted the challenge of identifying an 
appropriate theory that is also translatable to code, and 
commented that till date “there are no agent architectures that 
capture the different needs people have, their specific time-
dimensionality… and their activation in combination” [Sec 
5.6]. Jager’s comments seemed appropriate. Except for a few 
works [e.g., 11, 12, 13], much of social influence ABM 
models in psychology appeared to be built on model classes 
from outside the domain. Such models tended to contain 
assumptions labeled as “theory” or were highly stylized. 
While assumptions can be seen as just artifacts [14], the 
greater concern, as Edmonds et al [15] contended, may be the 
unintended use and misinterpretation of an ABM model. 
Our work here answers the call by Jager [10] for more 
psychological realism in social science ABM, with the aim 
being a theoretical exposition [15] of the theory of need for 
cognitive closure (NFCC). To do that, a novel ABM model is 
built, and two experiments are conducted. The first 
experiment compares the spread of majority topic between 
societies of high vs. low NFCC. The second experiment 
explores the evolution of popularity when the majority and 
minority topics are differentially dominated by agents of high 
vs. low NFCC. The model, proposed and developed here, 
links established psychological theories of NFCC, mere 
exposure effect, just noticeable difference, and bivariate 
evaluative model of attitude formation, to deconstruct agent 
interaction as a series of decisions of “whether to talk”, “who 
to talk”, and “what to talk about”. 
II. SOCIETAL CONTEXT 
NFCC explains human’s information search behavior. The 
theoretical exposition of NFCC is timely given the 
information tsunami we are in, the varying sources we get 
information from, and the epistemic insecurities we regularly 
feel in a globalized world [16]. In politics, conservatives are 
deemed to have higher levels of NFCC than liberals [17], and 
in elections, voters do not simply vote base on their position 
on a continuum, but do hold separate attitudes for each 
candidate and vote based on the differentials of such attitudes 
[18, 19]. Voters are also not passive agents who follow the 
majority in their vicinity, but are active participants in 
choosing what and who they want to influence [20]. Similarly, 
when choosing between brands or operating systems (e.g., 
Android and iOS), consumers note the attributes of their 
options and evaluate their relative merits. Our model, here, is 
targeted at such contexts where agents form opinions between 
two alternatives via repeated interactions with their peers. 
III. NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE 
Need for cognitive closure (NFCC) is both a construct and 
a theory within the framework of the lay epistemic theory [21]. 
As a construct, it describes human’s motivation towards a 
quick and firm answer, and can be construed as an individual 
difference (trait) as well as a situationally induced state. It 
varies on a continuum from low to high NFCC, with high 
NFCC indicating a greater need for a firm answer and aversion 
towards ambiguity [22]. As a theory it explains how humans 
move through the epistemic processes of information 
gathering, hypothesis generation, and answer affirmation. 
Epistemic process can be conceptualized as a progression 
from ambiguity to knowledge, going through a stage of seizing 
information, to a stage of freezing on formed opinion/answer. 
The point separating the two stages is termed the point of 
belief crystallization [23]. In the seizing stage, an individual 
acts on his/her urgency tendency to seek out information and 
form hypotheses to generate knowledge. Once sufficient 
clarity is gained, an individual will act on one’s permanence 
tendency to maintain position on the subject by reducing 
information search and avoiding alternative viewpoints [see 
reviews in 24, 25]. Accordingly, a high NFCC individual will 
have greater tendencies to seize on early information and form 
opinions quickly, while a low NFCC individual will form 
more hypotheses and evaluate more diverse information 
before coming to a conclusion [22]. 
A. Need for Cognitive Closure in Opinion Diffusion 
The theory of NFCC is chosen to model opinion diffusion 
because of its strong empirical base and affinity with attitude 
and social influence. For instance, Pierro et al. [26] found that 
extensive processing of information led to more persistent 
attitude change; Kruglanski et al. [27] found motivation for 
closure to moderate the mere exposure effect; Kosic et al. [28] 
found that immigrants’ acculturation is a function of NFCC 
and host country conditions, and Tadmor et al. [29] showed 
that multicultural experiences could unfreeze pre-existing 
“frozen” beliefs between groups. 
Here, we construe NFCC both as construct and theory, and 
model agents as encapsulating time-invariant levels of NFCC. 
The relative strength of attitudes for two alternatives combine 
to derive the information exchange behavior of agents as 
prescribed by NFCC theory. 
IV. AGENT DESIGN 
Two agent processes are central to the model. First is the 
determination of an agent’s advocacy for a topic (opinion) at 
a point in time, and second is the interaction process. 
A. Dual Attitude Mechanism 
Attitude is generally defined as “a person’s evaluation of 
an object on a favorable to unfavorable continuum” [30, p. 
300]. While there is agreement that attitude is specific to an 
object/entity, has an evaluative component, and is the basis for 
both social cohesion and faultlines; contention remains 
regarding the number of concurrent attitudes and continuums 
one can have to derive a  holistic evaluation of an attitude-
object [31]. Rather than a bipolar construction of attitude, 
researchers such as Cacioppo et al. [32] have reviewed 
evidence for the bivariate unipolar construction of attitudes, 
and in political psychology and consumer decision making it 
is the relative preference (attitudes) for alternatives that is 
predictive of actual voting and purchases [33, 34]. Hence as a 
deviation from past models, we adopt this latter approach to 
model opinions as the resolution of bivariate unipolar 
attitudes. 
Attitude strengthening. Following the bivariate 
perspective, our model simulates agents as holding 
independent attitudes towards two topics, Topic A and Topic 
B (SA and SB). Attitude strengths for each topic are continuous 
[0, ∞]. Changes in an agent’s attitude strengths, SA and SB, 
depends on the interaction the agent has at each time period. 
While there are several theories of attitude change, Zajonc’s 
[35] theory of the Mere Exposure Effect is one theory that is 
replicated in numerous cultures and contexts. It proposes that 
the frequency of exposure to an object increases the positive 
evaluation for the object. Accordingly, we model an agent’s 
attitude strength for a topic to increase when it has “talked” to 
about a topic. Hence, 
SA∙i∙t= {
SA∙i∙(t-1) + 1,  if "talked" about Topic A,
SA∙i∙(t-1),                    else.              
 (1) 
SB∙i∙t= {
SB∙i∙(t-1) + 1,  if "talked" about Topic B,
SB∙i∙(t-1),                    else.              
 (2) 
 
Mutual influence. Sharing the same ideas with the 
Bounded Confidence model [6], both agents follow (1) and 
(2) to update and strengthen their attitude for the topic to 
which they have just conversed about. 
Determining agent advocacy. At each time point, agents 
determine their preference (advocacy) for each of the two 
topics based on the relative attitude strength (RAS) of each 
topic. To account for the fact that attitudes are abstract and at 
times unconscious and hard to detect, the concept of Just-
noticeable difference [36, 37] is borrowed. An agent is an 
advocate of a topic at a point in time only if the topic strength 
for that topic is larger than the mean attitude strength of the 
two topic by a discernible difference D, which is invariant and 
similar for all agents. Using the mean attitude strength allows 
for a symmetric comparison. Specifically, an agent’s 














  Ui∙t, else.  
 (3) 
Where Ai·t and Bi·t refers to agent being an advocate for 
topic A and topic B at time t, respectively. Ui·t indicates that 
the agent is undecided and ambivalent to either of the topic. 
B. Integration with Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) 
Interacting or “talking” with friends and peers involves 
numerous micro-processes, not least the basic decisions of 
whether to engage in a conversation, who to talk to, and what 
to talk about. For agents in our model, these micro-processes 
are integrated with [23] specifications about individual 
differences of NFCC. Specifically, NFCC varies on a 
continuum, is trait-like, and reflects the manner one seeks 
information and draws conclusion from them. 
Determining NFCC Stages. To approach a more realistic 
representation while maintaining some tractability to better 
understand the model’s simulation, agents can be assigned one 
of five levels of NFCC, from Low NFCC, Moderately Low 
NFCC, Mid NFCC, Moderately High NFCC, to High NFCC. 
Agents’ NFCC level is invariant through out the simulation to 
approximate the trait-like aspect of NFCC. 
The theory of NFCC proposes that humans progress from 
a seizing stage to a freezing stage, where the motivation to 
gather information decreases as epistemic clarity is attained 
[23]. Hence we model agents’ NFCC stage as a function of the 
RAS between the two topics and a freezing-threshold. 
As the magnitude of the RAS increases and crosses the 
freezing-threshold, F, an agent’s epistemic need is satisfied 
and there is a greater likelihood of the agent choosing not to 
gather further information. Combining this rule with D, yields 
two sub-stages for NFCC’s seizing stage, and one freezing 
stage. Specifically, an agent’s NFCC stage, Πi,  at time t is 
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 (4) 
Where C1i·t refers to the first closure stage of seizing where 
the agent is ambivalent in its advocacy (Φi·t = Ui·t), and C2i·t 
refers to the second closure stage of seizing where the agent 
has an advocacy but the RAS is yet to cross the freezing 
threshold F. C3i·t refers to the closure stage of freezing. Hence, 
(4) requires that F ≥ D for all values of F. 
Deciding whether to talk. [23] showed that when one 
reaches the state of closure, one will be less likely to seek out 
further information that may risk introducing ambiguity or 
challenging their beliefs. This effect is more pronounced for 
those with high NFCC than those with low NFCC. Hence, an 
agent in the final stage of closure (freezing), may choose not 
to engage in any communication. This likelihood of non-
communication is greater for agents with high NFCC. 
Deciding who to talk to. The process of determining the 
conversation partner is guided both by NFCC, homophily, and 
network location. It is more likely that one picks an interaction 
partner from those in their first degree, and with those what 
share the same advocacy. Literature suggests that such 
likelihood can be influenced by one’s stage of closure and 
NFCC level. Those low in NFCC are more motivated to seek 
out alternative information, while those high in NFCC will 
more likely choose those who share similar opinions similar 
or just take the consensus view in haste [23]. 
Deciding what to talk about. Choosing people who share 
similar opinions will likely entail speaking about similar 
topics and strengthening existing beliefs each holds. However, 
empirical studies have shown that peope with low NFCC will 
seek out alternative views to gain epistemic clarity. On the 
contrary, people with high NFCC will not just refrain from 
talking to people with different views, but will also try to 
convert and convince others to adopt their beliefs, hence 
engaging in conversations about their own advocacy. 
Combining the decision to talk, who to talk to, and what to 
talk about, the following interactions types can be derived.  
 No interaction. (Nil) 
 Equal probability of speaking to someone of either 
topic, even if the alter topic is minority. Agents with 
low NFCC will show this characteristic. (Tk 1) 
 Randomly choose a neighor to talk about that 
neighbor’s topic. Therefore the probability of speaking 
about a topic is dependent on the number of topic 
advocates in the neighborhood.  (Tk 2) 
 Deliberately choose to talk to a neighbor holding the 
neighborhood popular topic. This is most likely to 
happen for high NFCC agents as they seek to reduce 
ambuity in the shortest period of time. (Tk 3) 
 Randomly choose a neighbor to talk about one’s own 
topic. This is likely to happen for high NFCC agents as 
they avoid talking about alternative topics. (Tk 4)  
With the above rules, the agent goes through the sequence 
outline in Figure 1. For purposes of investigation, agents in all 
simulation here are assigned one of five NFCC levels, each 
with a specific freezing-threshold F (Table 1) and specific 
probability for each interaction type (Table 2). 
 
Fig 1. Dual Attitude Agent Process 
TABLE I.  FREEZING THRESHOLDS FOR DIFFERENT NFCC LEVELS 
NFCC Levels Low Mod-Low Mid Mod-High High 
F 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.10 
 
TABLE II.  PROBABILITIES OF INTERACTION TYPES 
 
V. EXPERIMENT ONE 
The aim of experiment one is to investigate the impact of 
societal-level differences in NFCC on opinion diffusion via 
the dual attitude model. Opinion is represented as the 
advocacy, Φ, adopted by agents, and diffusion is the 
popularity/proportion of agents, Ω, advocating a topic. Two 
topics (A and B) are simulated with topic A as the majority 
topic at initiation. We simulate 1681 agents on a toroidal 
cellular automata, and monitor topic popularity, time to reach 
stabilization, and the number of topic clusters. Topic 
popularity allows us to understand the extent of diffusion, time 
to reach stabilization allows us to understand the speed of 
diffusion, and the number of topic clusters allows us to study 
the extent of local convergence and emergence of faultlines. 
















Tk 1: 0.90 
Tk 2: 0.10 
Tk 1: 0.70 
Tk 2: 0.30 
Tk 1: 0.25 
Tk 2: 0.25 
Tk 3: 0.50 
Tk 2: 0.30 
Tk 3: 0.70 
Tk 2: 0.10 
Tk 3: 0.90 
C2 
Seize 2 
Tk 2: 0.90 
Tk 4: 0.10 
Tk 2: 0.70 
Tk 4: 0.30 
Tk 2: 0.50 
Tk 4: 0.50 
Tk 2: 0.30 
Tk 4: 0.70 
Tk 2: 0.10 




Tk 2: 0.54 
Tk 4: 0.06 
Nil.: 0.50 
Tk 2: 0.35 
Tk 4: 0.15 
Nil.: 0.60 
Tk 2: 0.20 
Tk 4: 0.20 
Nil.: 0.70 
Tk 2: 0.09 
Tk 4: 0.21 
Nil.: 0.80 
Tk 2: 0.02 
Tk 4: 0.18 
We simulate societies of high vs low NFCC by specifying 
the proportion of agents at each level of NFCC. Each agent 
has a probability (as specified in Table 3) to be assigned one 
of five levels of NFCC at initiation. The exact proportion of 
agents at each NFCC level for each simulation run is thus 
stochastic and unbiased between the topics. The resultant 
distribution approximates a beta distribution [2, 4] for low 
NFCC society, and [4, 2] for high NFCC society. The choice 
to use five levels of NFCC is to approximate the real-world 
context of NFCC existing on a continuum, while the use of 
discrete levels of NFCC, is to allow tractability and better 
understanding of opinion dynamics across NFCC levels which 
would otherwise be difficult. 













2% 8% 17% 45% 28% 
Low NFCC 
Society 
28% 45% 17% 8% 2% 
For ease of interpretation, we setup the experiment with 
topic A as the referent topic, and conduct a parameter sweep 
of starting popularity from 0.55 – 0.95, at 0.10 intervals [0.55, 
0. 65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95]. At initiation, if an agent is assigned to 
have SA > SB,  then the value of SB is a random integer between 
0 – (SA-1). The entire assignment process is stochastic, and 
there can be agents who are ambivalent in their advocacy. 
Discernible difference, D = 0.05, remains invariant through all 
simulation runs. Simulation ends when the system has 
stabilized. The rule for stabilization is defined as no change in 
the number of topic A advocates and no change in the number 
of topic A cluster for the last 200 ticks. This stringent criteria 
is used as punctuated equilibriums can be detected for both 
popularity and cluster even though the system is still evolving 
to a new state. The agent’s network neighborhood here refers 
to the Moore’s neighborhood, and cluster count is defined as 
the number of agent with all neighbors who are in the same 
advocacy state. 
A. Results of Experiment One 
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) of 200 simulation runs per condition (total of 
2000 runs) to investigate the opinion diffusion between high 
versus low NFCC societies. Table 4A shows that high NFCC 
societies reach stabilization faster and than low NFCC 
societies. Notably the five NFCC levels are evenly distributed 
between advocates of both the majority and minority topics at 
initiation, and hence the only difference between the topics at 
initiation are their popularity levels. 
Table 4B showed that, in a high NFCC society, popularity 
for a majority topic will increase, while popularity for the 
same majority topic will decrease in a low NFCC society. This 
also means that minority topics will have a better chance of 
increasing its popularity in a low NFCC than high NFCC 
society. This result while intuitive on hindsight, is not 
explicitly coded, and have implications towards 
understanding the persistence and spread of minority opinion 
in different cultures and collectives. 
Table 4C showed that high NFCC societies tended to have 
less clusters than low NFCC societies when the simulation 
ends. Intuitively, high NFCC with greater popularity for the 
majority topic will lead to greater count of agents surrounded 
by like-minded agents. Yet graphically, high NFCC society 
have more “islets” of local minorities who are resistant to 
convert to the advocacy of their surrounding agents, while low 
NFCC society has more large regions of agents with similar 
advocacy. Unlike studies generating similar patterns from 
homophily or strategic regenesis, the pattern here is a result of 
mutual influence as a function of epistemic motivation for 
information. 
TABLE IV.  DIFFUSION UNDER HIGH VS. LOW NFCC SOCIETIES 
A: Time to Stability (t) 
Initial Topic A 
Popularity (%) 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
High NFCC 
Society 
771.84 805.32 797.48 686.12 511.64 
(151.36) (217.07) (193.27) (182.37) (115.07) 
Low NFCC 
Society 
1267.20 1517.80 1453.64 1289.88 708.56 
(345.47) (387.84) (312.89) (358.34) (144.09) 
      
B: End-state Popularity (%) 
Initial Topic A 
Popularity (%) 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
High NFCC 
Society 
56.04 67.92 79.12 88.19 96.50 
(1.47) (1.20) (0.98) (0.89) (0.46) 
Low NFCC 
Society 
53.13 62.55 72.37 81.94 91.19 
(1.07) (1.41) (1.40) (0.76) (0.52) 
      
C: Number of Clusters (n) 
Initial Topic A 
Popularity (%) 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
High NFCC 
Society 
24.52 82.84 255.04 587.48 1227.60 
(8.49) (17.17) (24.29) (46.61) (51.12) 
Low NFCC 
Society 
65.44 224.08 540.60 1002.92 1465.04 
(12.37) (37.09) (65.33) (53.07) (44.42) 
VI. EXPERIMENT TWO 
The aim of experiment two is to understand opinion 
dynamics, when NFCC levels are differentially distributed 
between competing topics (biased distribution). The results 
will offer insights into the rise/fall of support for a target in the 
real world (e.g., presidential candidate, religion, fashion 
brands) when advocates for one topic are dominated by agents 
with higher/lower in NFCC levels. 
Model in experiment one is used with a new initiation 
setup. Topic A advocates are assigned at initiation with NFCC 
distribution identical to that of a High NFCC Society, while 
topic B’s advocates are assigned to that of a Low NFCC 
Society (Table 3). For purposes of exploration, three initiating 
conditions were created: Topic A as majority (ΩA = 75%, ΩB 
= 25%), topic A as equal (ΩA = 50%, ΩB = 50%), and topic A 
as minority (ΩA = 25%, ΩB = 75%). When topic A is the 
majority, topic B is conversely the minority. Each condition is 
simulated 200 times. The same stopping rule and simulation 
outputs are applied. For reporting clarity, agents are referred 
to as either high or low NFCC as a group in a relative sense, 
instead of their specific levels. 
A. Results of Experiment Two 
Table 5 and Table 6 report mean values for topic 
popularity, time to stabilization, and number of clusters. 
Time to stabilization. Table 5 shows that when NFCC 
levels are differentially distributed between topics at 
initiation, societies with majority topic advocates high in 
NFCC, takes a longer time to stabilize than systems with 
majority topic advocates low in NFCC. This means that 
systems with a stubborn majority takes a longer time to 
stabilize than systems with stubborn minority. Tracking of 
multiple simulation runs explains this emergent difference. 
TABLE V.  SPEED OF DIFFUSION AND END-STATE POPULARITY 










of Topic A 
(%) 
Popularity 
of Topic B 
(%) 
25% 75%  740.3  23.87 76.06 
50% 50%  1477.14  56.83 42.83 
75% 25%  1523.37  90.15 9.65 
TABLE VI.  CHANGE IN CLUSTER 















25% 75%  0.02 84.94  0.36 177.45 
50% 50%  2.38 2.44  85.18 6.38 
75% 25%  87.84 0.01  900.13 0.01 
 
Principally, low NFCC agents spend more time in the 
seizing stage and need more interactions to strengthen their 
advocacy sufficiently to cross the freezing threshold. High 
NFCC agents, though, are close to the freezing stage or have 
already frozen and thus have a relatively stable advocacy 
leading to reduction in future interactions. 
Hence, in a low-NFCC-majority society (i.e. high-NFCC-
minority society) where low NFCC agents are majority 
advocates, there are more similar agents around them to 
reinforce their advocacy. This helps speed up progression 
from seizing to freezing for them who would otherwise spend 
much time seizing. For the minority topic advocates who are 
mostly high in NFCC, they are close to or have reached the 
freezing stage. Hence even if they have more opportunities to 
meet dissimilar agents, the reduction in tendency to speak to 
dissimilar others, reduces the extent of assimilative influence 
from dissimilar agents, helping these minority agents to 
maintain their initial advocacy. As such, the peer 
strengthening of fellow advocates who are also low NFCC 
agents and the unwillingness of high NFCC agents to interact 
led to a relatively fast stabilization of the system. 
In a low-NFCC-minority system (i.e. high-NFCC-majority 
society), the low NFCC agents are minority, and hence are 
frequently exposed to alternate views. Thus rather than 
strengthening of their initial beliefs, they go through a lengthy 
process of first unfreezing, then seizing [23], before they 
strengthen the advocacy for the new topic. Because of the 
tendency to sample diverse viewpoints evenly, these agents 
spend much time in the seizing stage even when there is an 
abundance of majority topic agents in the neighborhood, 
hence leading to slower stabilization. 
In addition, the greater number of agents for the majority 
topic gives rise to more homogeneous regions of majority-
advocates. This leads to a significant portion of majority topic 
advocates being distant (> 1 degree apart) from the minority 
as they are away from the edge of these clusters. Hence despite 
a numerical advantage, the principle of local influence meant 
there will not be a proportionate increase in opportunities to 
influence the minority. As such, the minority agents who are 
low in NFCC stay in a seizing stage for long periods of time, 
often alternating between advocacies. 
In sum, if there are two competing ideas/topics with one 
topic being the majority and dominated by high NFCC agents, 
the minority agents who are low in NFCC stay in a state of 
indecision for prolong periods of time as they gather diverse 
information to unlearn their initial advocacy. And despite the 
large number of majority topic advocates around, the majority 
topic advocates who are high in NFCC do not seek to engage 
in conversation, and even if they do, most are not immediate 
neighbors to the minority topic advocates. 
Popularity. Table 5 shows that when majority topic 
advocates are low in NFCC, the increase in popularity is only 
marginal. However when majority topic advocates are high in 
NFCC, the increase in popularity is large. Even when the 
initiating popularity of topics are equal, the topic with 
advocates high in NFCC showed an increase in popularity, 
rather than a decrease in popularity for the topic initiated with 
low NFCC agents. Fig. 2 rearranged the values in Table 5 to 
show this high NFCC advantage. This advantage helps 
increase popularity for a topic when is majority or equal at 
initiation, and prevents popularity loss when a topic is a 
minority at initiation. Observing the simulations revealed that 
this advantage is due to low NFCC agents considering 
alternative views and allowing themselves to switch, while 
high NFCC agents are relatively fixed in their advocacy. 
Hence, this advantage is attributable to the behaviors of the 
low NFCC agents than that of high NFCC agents. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Popularity when topics initiated at majority, equal, and at minority.  
Clusters. Table 6 shows that across all three conditions, 
the majority topic at initiation is produce more end-state 
clusters than the minority topic. The increase in clusters for 
majority topic with high NFCC is much more than that when 
the majority topic is initiated with low NFCC. Both these 
results are expected given that the high NFCC advantage leads 
to greater end-state popularity and hence more cluster for the 
high NFCC dominated topic will emerge.   
VII. DISCUSSION 
Edmonds’s [15] taxonomy on the uses of ABM defined 
theoretical exposition as a process of “establishing then 
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set of mechanisms” [para 5.6]. We proposed a novel 
mechanism of opinion resolution and illustrated its use with a 
high fidelity formalization of the theory of NFCC. Through 
two experiments, we found some results from experiment one 
that converge with other diffusion models [e.g., 11], and 
results from experiment two to be counterintuitive at first 
glance but logical when agent dynamics are investigated. 
As a nascent model, a wider exploration of the parameters, 
verification, and validation is needed [14]. For instance the 
small, but significant, differences in Table 4B could be an 
artifact of network size that limited the evolution of the 
“society”. Hence, follow-up research will explore the 
robustness of this and other auxiliary assumptions, and future 
research could consider docking the model by swapping the 
dual attitude mechanism with a bipolar univariate attitude 
formalization to ascertain the robustness of patterns found. 
Yet the dual attitude model of NFCC could be the first 
opinion diffusion ABM that uses a unipolar bivariate 
construction of opinions, while balancing theoretical fidelity 
with the need for tractability. The experiments were aimed to 
provide a theoretical exposition of NFCC, and in so doing we 
observed dynamics similar to what we see in the real world. 
The evolution of popularity goes through bouts of stases and 
spurts, especially when initial differences in topic are small. 
These punctuated equilibriums are observed together with the 
regularity of a Devil’s staircase [38], where we observe self-
similar patterns at different time scales in the same simulation 
run. Hence, if periods of cultural stability is analogical to 
punctuated equilibriums, the underlying fractal dimensions 
justifies humans to look into their society’s past to foresee the 
timing of future cultural shifts. 
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